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Discussant's Response to 
An Analysis of the Audit Framework 
Focusing on Inherent Risk and the Role of 
Statistical Sampling in Compliance Testing 
William R. Kinney, Jr. 
University of Michigan 
Don Leslie has prepared a paper with many ideas that give rise to a number 
of implications for both the theory and practice of auditing and that merit careful 
thought, discussion, and debate. I agree with most of what he has to say but, of 
course, have some caveats, reservations, and qualifications. 
The paper has nine sections, and I plan to comment on parts of all nine, 
concentrating on three central topics: the audit risk formula, assessment of the 
prior probability of material error, and the role of compliance tests. My closing 
comments will address some of the political aspects of Leslie's policy 
recommendations. 
The Audit Risk Formula 
Leslie is correct that the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 can 
understate the "final audit risk" (FAR)* relative to the approach suggested in 
Leslie, Teitlebaum, and Anderson (1979) and the CICA's Extent of Audit 
Testing (EAT). He is also correct that a reasonable interpretation of SAS 47 
may lead to a formula that will always understate FAR relative to the EAT 
approach. Finally, he is correct that the difference between FAR calculated 
using SAS 39 and FAR using EAT is small when the prior probabiity of material 
error (PPE) is small. 
Leslie implicity assumes that for the zero error population, every item in 
the population has zero error and any audit test will confirm this fact. I make a 
slightly less restrictive assumption that net error in the population is zero. 
Under the latter assumption, substantive tests of details (STD) may lead to 
incorrect rejection, and, of course, analytical review (AR) may lead to incorrect 
rejection even if every item has zero error. Under the zero net error 
assumption, the EAT formula understates FAR relative to a slightly more 
complete "Bayesian Risk Product" (BRP) calculation* because the EAT 
approach ignores the risk of incorrect rejection for both analytical review 
procedures and substantive tests of details. 
* Since Leslie sometimes uses "final audit risk" and "posterior risk" interchangeably and since 
posterior risk seems to be a misnomer as used here, I will use "final audit risk'' (FAR) throughout. 
* I refer to this approach as the Bayesian risk product rather than Bayesian since it assumes that 
decisions are made on the basis of the likelihood information and not the posterior that combines 
the likelihood information with the prior distribution. 
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To illustrate, consider Leslie's Figure 3. Leslie's "ladder-tree diagram" is 
reproduced as the top part of Figure 1.** The bottom branches diagram the 
state for which there is zero net error in the account. Leslie calculates the final 
audit risk by dividing the probability of receiving "accept" signals from both 
AR and STD under the condition of "intolerable" error (ME) that has not been 
detected by internal control by the sum of the probabilities that such audit tests 
would be obtained under either ME or zero net error condition.*** He 
implicitly assumes that the zero (net) error case will always lead to acceptance 
by the auditor. 
While the assumed outcome of no incorrect rejection signals is likely given 
that there is zero net error in an account, it is also true that even in the absence 
of error the analytical review procedures and/or the substantive tests of details 
will sometimes indicate that material error may exist. That is, the auditor may 
incur the cost of needlessly extending the audit, revising the audit plan, 
suggesting incorrect adjustments, or withdrawing or qualifying the opinion. For 
specificity, I have included these branches with incorrect rejection probabilities 
equal to .05 and .10 respectively. 
With the inclusion of these additional branches to the bottom branch of 
Leslie's ladder tree, we see that the possibility of completing the audit with no 
indication of material error from any test can arise by the top most route (with 
probability .0075) or via the top route of the bottom branch (with probability 
.6412 (.75 x .95 x .90)). The denominator for the FAR calculation is the sum of 
the probability of the top route and the top route of the bottom branch. Thus, 
the FAR for BRP is: 
F A R = PPE x PIC x AR x STD  
(PPE x DIC x AR x STD) + (1-PPE) x (1-RIRAR) x (1-RIRSTD) 
.0075 
= = .0116 
.0075 + .75 x .95 x .90 
where RIRAR and RIRSTD are the risks of incorrect rejection. The formula is 
identical to that of EAT with the exception of the RIRAR and RIRSTD factors. 
Since these factors are always 1.0, the Bayesian risk product will always be 
greater than or equal to the FAR from the EAT formula. How much less will 
depend, in part, upon the level of the RIR factors. Thus, the BRP approach will 
always lead to planned sample sizes that are equal to or greater than those 
using EAT. 
To elaborate on the comparison, the relative sample sizes for SAS 39, SAS 
47, EAT, and BRP (with PPE = .75, DIC = .30, AR=.40, and FAR =.03) 
would be 1.00, .79, 1.77 and 1.88. Thus the sample size for BRP is about 6% 
greater than that for EAT. A similar calculation using PPE = .25 would yield 
1.0, 0, .19 and .31. Thus, for the low PPE case, SAS 47, EAT and BRP 
require much less substantive tests of details than does SAS 39. 
As shown in the figure, the difference in FAR for PPE= .25 is .0017 or 
about 17% more than FAR using EAT. For the PPE = .75 case, FAR using 
** For those familiar with Bayesian decision trees, the Leslie approach differs in that his "ladder 
tree" places the prior probabilities of states at the start of the tree rather than at the end of each 
branch. 
* * * I will use ME to denote "just intolerable" monetary error for the account. Thus it is the single 
account counterpart of materiality for the financial statements taken as a whole. 
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FAR (SAS 39) = 1 x .3 x .4 x .25 = .0300 
* IA denotes "incorrect acceptance", CR denotes "correct rejection", etc. 
BRP is .0116 or 15.3% more than EAT. While these differences are not huge, 
they aren't negligible either. If the EAT formula provides appropriate correc-
tion of the SAS 39 formula then the BRP correction to EAT would also seem 
justified. 
As to the direction of the misstatement of risk, Leslie shows that, under his 
assumptions, the SAS 39 formula is conservative relative to EAT for PPE .5 
and is not conservative for PPE > .5. He is especially concerned about the use 
of SAS 39 for PPE>.5 since statement users may not have adequate 
protection against material error in audited financial statements. Yet it seems 
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FAR (SAS 47) = .25 x .3 x .4 x .25 = .0075 
FAR (EAT) . 0075 .0075 + .75 .0099 
FAR (BRP) .0075 .0075 + .6412 .0116 
likely that, in the presence of a high expectation of material error, the auditor 
would probably not use the risk formula in an "hypothesis testing" mode.1 
Rather, the auditor might use an "estimation" approach to adequately 
estimate the extent of error so that adjustments can be made or perhaps some 
other strategy pursued in which the client attempts to correct errors. In the 
latter case, sampling may not even be applicable. Thus, apropriate use of the 
SAS 39 formula may not lead to excessive risk of incorrect acceptance but may, 
of course, lead to costly overauditing for the PPE .5 cases and would be of 
concern to an auditor who faces competition. 
A reader familiar with Bayesian statistics will note at least two deficiencies 
in all four formulations of the auditor's problem. First, all approaches assume 
that ME that is detected by DIC cannot lead to incorrect rejection (i.e., 
Leslie's original assumption). A more complete formulation would direct the 
.70 branch from the DIC node to the lower AR node. This change would lead to 
FAR = .0080 for EAT and FAR = .0094 for BRP. Second, all of the approaches 
ignore the possibility that the auditor might misassess IR or misassess the 
reliance to be placed on internal control. For example, the auditor might 
conclude, on the basis of a study and evaluation of internal control, that DIC is 
.30 when the correct probability is .50. A complete Bayesian formulation would 
consider such misevaluations. 
Finally, the AICPA models, EAT, and BRP implicitly assume that one of 
two states must occur—either net error is zero or net error is equal to ME. 
Outcomes between zero and ME as well as error greater than ME cannot 
exist. Leslie believes that such simplification may lead to substantially different 
answers than would a continuous outcome space. I am not convinced that 
relative sample sizes will be substantially affected by allowing continuous state 
spaces. I base this view on the lack of meaningful differences for several 
continuous state follow-up studies of the Kinney (1975) discrete Bayesian 
model. Also, the imprecision inherent in the auditor's subjective assessments 
may overshadow any differences due to continuous state modelling. 
How Should IR and Internal Control Risks be Assessed? 
Another area of considerable controversy in the profession concerns the 
appropriate way to consider the three client-specific factors related to PPE. 
These factors are inherent risk (IR), preventive internal controls (PIC), and 
detective internal controls (DIC). In SAS 47, para. 24, the Auditing Standards 
Board suggested that the auditor may separately assess IR and "control risk" 
(PIC and DIC) and presumably multiply them together to get the risk that ME 
will occur and not be detected by IC. Leslie suggests that IR and PIC be 
considered together and multiplied by DIC to yield the same risk. A third 
alternative, also mentioned in SAS 47, para. 24, is to jointly assess the effects 
of all three factors. That is, the auditor would assess the overall risk that ME 
would occur in the accounting process and not be prevented or detected by 
internal controls. The joint method requires no separate assessment of 
individual factors that have not been separately observed and does not specify a 
particular combination algorithm (e.g., multiplication).2 
Using as an analogy, gun control at Kansas City International Airport, we 
might ask a gun control worker to assess the joint probability that a plane 
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departing the airport h a s one or more guns on board. Alternatively, we might 
ask the worker to estimate the number that would, in the absence of all 
controls, carry a gun on board and the number that would be caught by the 
controls. The worker's response to the alternative question is likely to be 
"How should I know?—I've never observed would-be passengers without the 
control." Furthermore, the worker is not likely to be able to separately assess 
PIC and DIC (it seems clear to me that the X-ray machine is detective but has 
preventive aspects as well). Finally, it is not clear that simple multiplication of 
separately assessed risks is in order due to lack of independence, because 
passengers' behavior is conditioned by their expectation of the control 
components. 
I favor the alternative of joint assessment and argued for it at the Auditing 
Standards Board deliberations on SAS 47. As discussed by the ASB and Don 
Leslie, behavioral research may lead to a determination of the best method. 
Compliance Testing 
Leslie's concern about the "5 and 5 will get ya 60" syndrome deserves 
comment. The example of a .05 tolerable rate (which, in practice, would have 
been set based on the auditor's judgment about the relationship of the 
prescribed control to ME) and .05 risk of overreliance due to compliance 
deviations originated in SAP 54 in 1972 as an example of reasonable levels of 
the factors. These levels were continued in SAS 39, and an example sample 
size of 60 was added. Sixty was chosen to show nonstatistical samplers that a 
compliance sample size that would satisfy the required criteria of "acceptably 
low" risk that the error rate for the population does not exceed a "reason-
able" tolerable rate requires a compliance sample size of considerably greater 
than, say, 5 or 10—even if no deviations are observed. It is only an example 
and not intended to be a standard itself. Leslie does not cite evidence to 
support his claim that it has become the standard the world over. Even if it has, 
however, it has probably led to an increase in compliance sample sizes and, 
thus, is not necessarily bad. 
Furthermore, it is not clear to me that a "smoke to fire" ratio is the only 
way to assess the risk of overreliance due to the compliance portion of the joint 
risk of overreliance. There would seem to be various ways to map the design 
evaluation and rate of deviation (whether based on documents or dollars of 
book value) to the posterior probability of error. 
Is compliance testing always necessary for reliance? Leslie raises some 
challenging questions with respect to required compliance testing for preven-
tive controls. He suggests that a preferred alternative is to look for evidence 
that such controls have actually detected errors. While such a procedure may 
be acceptable under some circumstances, in a generally poor control environ-
ment employees may document phony "prevention hits" or detected errors 
that were not really errors. That is, evidence of effectiveness may not indicate 
application of a control at all. Again, joint assessment of risk may help. 
Conclusions 
To summarize, I agree with Leslie that the audit risk formula can be 
improved. For example, it can be modified to be less conservative for low PPE 
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audit situations. Also, I agree that future Auditing Standards Board considera-
tion should be given to elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts. Whether 
official improvement of the formula is possible within the present ASB is, of 
course, an open question. 
It has been my experience at the ASB that the firms that have the most 
structured audit approaches generally vote in support of structured standards. 
Similarly, those with the least structured approaches regularly vote against 
further structure. In drafting standards, there is a desire to make them "read" 
better by simplifying the wording, and yet complex concepts often require 
seemingly difficult wording to be correct. The audit risk formula seems to be a 
victim of such a conflict. The concepts of audit planning and evaluation are 
complex—a simple formula and few words are not likely to be technically 
correct. Yet complex formulae and discussion will not receive Board support. 
While there is little disagreement that auditors tend to behave as if they are 
Bayesians, there is much disagreement as to how this should be expressed in 
professional standards. There is a valid question of how much "theory" should 
be in professional standards. I do not believe that much more structure is likely 
to be forthcoming from the ASB. Elaboration of the PIC and DIC concepts is 
more likely since they are easier to understand. 
While the audit risk formula of SAP 54 and SAS 39 may be subject to 
misuse, it has led to considerable research and experimentation as well as to 
enlightenment of scholars and practitioners. It indicates relevant audit planning 
factors and the direction of their effects on auditing procedures. Furthermore, 
even if a practitioner uses the formula "simplistically," I know of no evidence 
or even claims that those not using the formula take larger samples or conduct 
more thorough or extensive audits. That is, I have never heard critics of the 
formula claim that they do not use it because they feel that they should be 
taking larger samples. 
I have heard the opposite claim—that a firm does not use the formula 
because it leads to sample sizes that are too large. This latter result, however, 
is often because the auditor has not taken advantage of his or her judgment in 
designing the sampling applications, rather than the potential problem that 
Leslie mentions. SAS 39 is quite clear in the statement that nonstatistical 
sample sizes for a given level of effectiveness cannot be smaller than a well 
designed statistical sample. 
I am concerned that those who have been using the SAP 54 and SAS 39 
formula may now apply the implicit formula of SAS 47 in a way that increases 
FAR. It seems to me that many practitioners have already included some 
allowance for inherent risk in assessing IC under the SAS 39 guidance. That is, 
they have implicitly adjusted the IC factor to include an allowance for inherent 
risk as well as internal controls. In effect, they use IC as the PPE when 
planning AR and STD. If they now use the same value for the IC factor and 
multiply it by an IR less than one, they will double count IR and will unduly 
restrict STD. The extent of this potential problem can also be addressed by 
behavioral research, of course. 
In conclusion, I believe that Don Leslie has written a thoughtful and very 
timely paper. Increasing competition and the micro computer are making 
operational many of the models that we have discussed at this conference for 
the last ten years, beginning with Felix (1974). Field workers now have the 
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computing power necessary to do sophisticated audit planning and evidence 
integration. We scholars can no longer avoid these issues by using the excuse 
of computational impracticality. Consideration of Leslie's analysis, criticisms, 
and suggestions can help all of us improve the practice, theory, and, perhaps, 
the regulation of auditing. 
End Notes 
1. See Cushing and Loebbecke (1983), for additional discussion. 
2. A similar problem with multiplication of risks is noted in Jiambalvo and Waller (1984), p. 87. 
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